Rehnquist Court\u27s Changed Reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Context of Voting Rights by Grubert, Jeanmarie K.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 65 Issue 4 Article 34 
1997 
Rehnquist Court's Changed Reading of the Equal Protection 
Clause in the Context of Voting Rights 
Jeanmarie K. Grubert 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeanmarie K. Grubert, Rehnquist Court's Changed Reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Context 
of Voting Rights, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1819 (1997). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/34 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
NOTE
THE REHNQUIST COURT'S CHANGED READING OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THE CONTEXT
OF VOTING RIGHTS
Jeanmarie K. Grubert
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno' ("Shaw P') recog-
nized a new constitutional violation under the Equal Protection
Clause in the context of voting rights. The Court found that a district-
ing plan2 which segregates voters on the basis of race and disregards
traditional districting principles constitutes a racial gerrymander 3 in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' Shaw I marked a departure
from the Court's earlier voting rights cases, which required a showing
of discriminatory effect to establish a claim of vote dilution under the
Equal Protection Clause.5 The Rehnquist Court built on its Shaw I
decision in Miller v. Johnson,6 Shaw v. Hunt,7 ("Shaw IP') and Bush v.
Vera," finding that an equal protection violation is established simply
by a showing that race was the predominant factor in the creation of
the district lines.9
1. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2. Districting plans, or the lines separating voters into different voting districts,
are redrawn every ten years by the political incumbents. T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw
v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 588, 588 (1993).
3. The term "gerrymander" was coined in 1812 in reference to the bizarre dis-
tricting plan of Essex County, Massachusetts, which was approved by Governor El-
bridge Gerry. Id at 588 n.1. Racial gerrymandering refers to the creation of an
abnormally shaped district drawn to advantage one racial group. See e.g., Shaw l 509
U.S. at 670-71 (White, J., dissenting) (providing examples of various districting prac-
tices constituting racial gerrymanders to the disadvantage of racial minorities). Prior
to Shaw 1, racial gerrymandering was a claim brought by members of a racial minority
who were fenced-out of the political process: "The racial gerrymander carves districts
so as to diminish the minority percentage in districts or, alternatively, it packs almost
all minority voters into one or a few districts to prevent their having influence outside
that area." Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Acc A Brief History, in Controver-
sies in inority Voting 7, 23 n.56 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds.,
1992). The Shaw I plaintiffs, however, were members of the white majority.
4. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 642-43.
5. See infra part HA.
6. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
7. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
8. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
9. See infra part II.B.
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Although much has been written concerning the Supreme Court's
changed equal protection jurisprudence, 10 most commentators have
used an originalist approach1 to analyze the Court's reading of the
Equal Protection Clause. This Note proposes that Professor Lessig's
translation theory, which recognizes that changed readings of the
Constitution are not necessarily unfaithful readings,'" provides a
stronger method for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and for
demonstrating that the Court is not remaining faithful to the Constitu-
tion in Shaw I and its progeny.' 3 This Note argues that under the
translation model, recognition and treatment of race in voting rights
would be faithful to the Constitution because it would be consistent
with both the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the pre-Shaw I cases addressing voting rights under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Part I of this Note sets out Professor Lessig's translation theory and
compares his approach to originalism; it concludes that the translation
model remedies many weaknesses in the originalist approach. Part II
traces the voting rights cases from Baker v. Carr,'4 which first recog-
nized that state apportionment plans' 5 were justiciable in federal
courts, through the Shaw I line of cases to demonstrate that the Court
changed its reading of the Equal Protection Clause beginning with
10. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Madisonian Multiculturalism, 45 Am. U. L. Rev.
751 (1996); Jamin B. Raskin, From "Colorblind" White Supremacy to American Mul-
ticulturalism, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 743 (1996); Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind
Court, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 791 (1996); Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise:
Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
1059 (1995).
11. "Originalism," as used in this Note, refers to a strict originalist approach that
would treat the Framers' intent as dispositive for deciding current constitutional ques-
tions. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659, 659 (1987)
(explaining originalism as "faithful adherence to 'the original intent of the framers"').
Originalism does not have a precise meaning, but rather refers to a general theory of
constitutional interpretation that looks to the Framers' intent as a starting point; vary-
ing degrees of originalism advocate different levels of adherence to the original intent.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 1086-87 (1989) (discussing the varying degrees of originalism); Jed
Rubenfeld, On Fidelity in Constitutional Law, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1469, 1486 (1997)
(contrasting strict originalism with the "'softer' versions of originalism" which advo-
cate remaining faithful to the ideals or principles of the Framers rather than to their
exact intentions). Indeed, Professor Lessig's translation theory, which this Note will
employ to analyze the Rehnquist Court's voting rights jurisprudence, has been con-
strued as similar to originalism because "both are based on the notion of a primordial
text whose meaning has grown elusive because of the passage of time." Sanford Lev-
inson, Translation: Who Needs It?, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1457, 1460 (1997).
12. See infra part I.
13. See infra part I.B.
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. States are required to apportion, or distribute voters into different voting dis-
tricts, on the basis of population so as not to violate the Equal Protection Clause by
diluting the weight of certain votes on the basis of residence. See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 566-68 (1964).
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Shaw L In part III, Professor Lessig's translation theory is applied to
the voting rights cases to determine whether the Court's changed
reading constitutes a faithful reading. Part III begins by reviewing the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and the original un-
derstanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. The original understand-
ing is viewed as the implementation of a particular concept of
representative government into the Fourteenth Amendment. Part I
then asserts that racial classifications which benefit a racial minority
are constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.
This Note concludes that under Professor Lessig's model of constitu-
tional interpretation, the Rehnquist Court's reading of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in the Shaw I line of cases is not faithful to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
I. FIDELITY IN TRANSLATION
This part first presents Professor Lessig's fidelity theory as a two-
step process. It then compares Professor Lessig's method of constitu-
tional interpretation with originalism and concludes that translation is
a more useful method to analyze the Supreme Court's reading of the
Equal Protection Clause in the voting rights cases.
A. Translation Theory
Professor Lessig sets out his translation theory as a method of con-
stitutional interpretation in Fidelity in Translation6 and in a number
of his later articles. 17 Professor Lessig notes, as a simple historical
fact, that readings of the Constitution change.' 8 Indeed, he argues
that in certain circumstances a changed reading will be necessary in
order to remain faithful to the meaning of the Constitution.' 9 As a
16. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Lessig, Fidelity].
17. See, ag., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1365
(1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Constraint]; Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Lieber, 16
Cardozo L. Rev. 2249 (1995); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federal-
ism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995) thereinafter Les-
sig, Understanding Changed Readings]; Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability:
Responses to Responding to Imperfection, 74 Tex. L Rev. 839 (1996) [hereinafter
Lessig, What Drives Derivability] (reviewing Responding to Imperfection: The The-
ory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)).
18. Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at 1366; Lessig, Understanding Changed
Readings, supra note 17, at 396. Professor Levinson explained Professor Lessig's
translation model as a method "to address the ways that we explain and/or justify...
the changes that undoubtedly have occurred within the American constitutional or-
der." Levinson, supra note 11, at 1461.
19. Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 17, at 423-25; Lessig &
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, supra note 17, at 87-88. Professor
Lessig asserts, for example, that in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
the Court overruled the reading of the Equal Protection Clause in Plessy v. Ferguson,
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result, a theory of constitutional interpretation must account for these
changed readings to distinguish between changes that are faithful to
the Constitution and changes that are not.20 A change that remains
faithful to the Constitution would permit a new reading of the text
that preserves the meaning of the original reading in situations where
the context of the original text has changed.21 Professor Lessig sug-
gests, for example, that modem technological advances, such as
automobiles and helicopters, would govern the length of time that po-
lice could reasonably delay before presenting a warrantless arrestee to
a magistrate under the Fourth Amendment's proscription of "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. '2 2 Thus, the reading of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement has changed from the
Framing-where it may have been reasonable to take six hours to
travel thirty miles on horseback-to the present-where it would no
longer be reasonable to allow such a delay in light of the changed
technology. Professor Lessig asserts that in order to preserve original
meaning across changed contexts, it is necessary to "translate" the
original understanding of a constitutional provision into the present
context.23 Similar views have been expressed in both case law and
articles prior to the publication of Professor Lessig's theory.2A In ad-
dition, a number of legal scholars have applied Professor Lessig's
163 U.S. 537 (1896), in response to a change in social science. Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings, supra note 17, at 423-25. When Plessy was decided, science-
genetic determinism-supported the racist status quo and provided judges with a rea-
son to uphold segregation. Once the views of genetic determinism or scientific racism
were effectively refuted, courts no longer had any reasonable basis for upholding seg-
regation. Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 17, at 423-25.
20. Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at 5; Lessig, Understanding Changed Read-
ings, supra note 17, at 396.
21. Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 17, at 396-400 (giving ex-
amples of constitutional provisions whose meanings have evolved over time).
22. Id. at 397-400.
23. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1171-73; see also Lessig, Constraint, supra
note 17, at 1370. In analyzing Professor Lessig's model, Professor William M. Treanor
explains that "a translator seeks to identify the ends that the Constitution's framers
sought to advance and then interprets a constitutional provision in a way that best
advances those ends in today's world." William M. Treanor, The Original Understand-
ing of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 857 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1985) (noting that due to
changes in context since the Fourth Amendment was enacted, a literal application
would not preserve the original meaning); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
639-40 (1943) (discussing the "task of translating" the Bill of Rights from the eight-
eenth century to address the problems of the twentieth century); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (discussing how constitutions must account for chang-
ing conditions and purposes over time); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 205 (1980) (finding that legislative his-
tory and intent are useful but not binding "in the light of changing experiences and
perceptions").
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model of translation to interpret the Constitution and to analyze vari-
ous legal issues.'
Professor Lessig's fidelity theory is premised on the notion that the
meaning of a text depends on the context within which the text is writ-
ten.26 Therefore, one cannot understand the meaning of a text absent
knowledge of its background context because the same words may
have very different meanings depending upon the surrounding con-
text.27 For example, Professor Lessig points out that the text "Vote
Republican" uttered by Thomas Jefferson in 1800 would have had a
very different meaning than the meaning this same text would have if
uttered by the Republican Party in 1996. As a result, the reader may
distort the original meaning of the text by ignoring a change in the
context.29 Professor Lessig explains that the background context con-
sists of the underlying facts and values which led the author to use
particular words to communicate the intended meaning in the text.30
The elements making up the background context may change over
time.
As a further example, Professor Lessig notes that homosexuality
was at one time considered a pathology.31 On this basis, the 1952 Mc-
25. See, eg., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective
The Right to Remain Silent, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2625, 2668 & n.170 (1996) (arguing that
"treating today's sworn statements like the unswom statements of the past might be
the most accurate 'translation' of the Framers' understanding"); Akhil R. Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 816 n.223 (1994); Akhil R.
Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis L Rev. 1169, 1173
n.9, 1189 n.44, 1193 n.53 (1995) (referring to Professor Lessig's theory of translation
to support his suggested jury reforms); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous
Branch, 105 Yale LJ. 1725, 1811-16 (1996) (comparing competing theories of transla-
tion, originalism, and synthesis to analyze the changed role of the executive branch);
Charles A. Reich, Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middle
Americans and the Poor, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 817, 822 (1996) (applying translation
theory to provide constitutional protection for new forms of wealth such as social
security and welfare benefits); Rosen, supra note 10, at 799, 801 n.58 (arguing for the
Supreme Court to use translation in their Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence);
Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twveny-First Century World,
48 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1995) (illustrating translation by using the President's ex-
panded authority as an example); Treanor, supra note 23, at 855-87 (translating the
Takings Clause into a modern context).
26. Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at 1369-70; Lessig, What Drives Derivabiliy,
supra note 17, at 843. As noted by Professor Frederick Schauer, "Lessig appears to
take the existence or non-existence of a background social or political context as the
primary determinant of constitutional outcome." Frederick Schauer, Constitutional
Invocations, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1295, 1296 n.7 (1997). Professor Schauer instead
advocates "formalism" or "textualism." Id. at 1298. This approach, unlike Professor
Lessig's, asserts that a literal reading of the legal text should be determinative "even
when that approach impedes the judicial realization of morally and constitutionally
optimal outcomes." Id.
27. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1175.
28. Lessig, The Limits of Lieber, supra note 17, at 2249.
29. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1175.
30. Id. at 1178.
31. Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 17, at 415.
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Carran-Walter Act barred homosexuals from entering the United
States.32 In 1973, however, the American Psychiatric Association
changed its classification of homosexuality, acknowledging that it was
not a psychopathic condition.3 As a result, in Lesbian/Gay Freedom
Day Committee, Inc. v. INS,34 the Court found that the INS could no
longer exclude homosexuals on this basis.35
Professor Lessig contends that an understanding of each element
constituting the background context may be necessary to faithfully in-
terpret a text but that a change in any individual element does not
necessarily alter the meaning of the text or require a changed reading
of the original text.36 Rather, Professor Lessig proposes that a
changed reading is required as a matter of interpretive fidelity only
when a "presupposition" changes 7.3  According to Professor Lessig, a
"presupposition" is an element so fundamental to the meaning of the
original text that if this element were to change, the text would have a
different meaning in the second context and, accordingly, would re-
quire a changed reading to remain faithful to the meaning of the origi-
nal text.3 In other words, had this element been different at the time
the original text was written, the author would have used different
words in the original text because a proper understanding of this ele-
ment was essential to understand the meaning of the text.39 Professor
Lessig posits that there are two steps in determining if a new reading
is faithful to the original meaning.
1. Step I of Fidelity: The Original Understanding of the Text
The first step of fidelity theory is consistent with the originalist ap-
proach:n0 the reader must read the text in its original context to dis-
cern the meaning the text had at the time it was written.41 But
Professor Lessig points out that an adherent to originalism, which
could be described as "one-step fidelity," would simply apply that
meaning in the present situation, thereby ignoring any disparity be-
tween the original and present contexts.42 In contrast, Professor Les-
sig argues that translation, or "two-step fidelity," is required for legal
32. Id.
33. Id- at 417.
34. 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), affd sub nom., Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470
(9th Cir. 1983).
35. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Committee, 541 F. Supp. at 585.
36. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1180-81.
37. Id. at 1181; Treanor, supra note 23, at 857.
38. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1180-81, 1213.
39. Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at 1370; Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at
1179-80.
40. See supra note 11.
41. Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at 1373; Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at
1182-83; Treanor, supra note 23, at 857.
42. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1183; see Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at
1370.
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texts because they are normative texts which must first be read in con-
text to understand their original meaning, and then applied faithfully
in the present context.43 While the two-step fidelitist endeavors to
translate the original application of the normative text into the current
context, the one-step fidelitist, by attempting only to preserve the
meaning of the original text, ignores possible changes in context,
which may change rather than preserve meaning; this can result in
infidelity to the law."4
2. Step II of Fidelity: Translation
Translation is the process that neutralizes the impact that changed
context will have on a text's meaning.45 Before describing how trans-
lation actually works in practice, however, it is worth discussing how
translation, in theory, can accomplish the goals of the two-step fide-
litist. As it is commonly understood, translation is the process of con-
verting a text in one language into the text of a different language
while preserving the meaning of the original text.4 ' Translation at-
tempts to diminish the effect changed language has on the meaning of
a text. If language is viewed as the background context of the text,
translation is a process that offsets contextual changes.47 Professor
Lessig claims that two-step fidelity applies this model to neutralize
other types of contextual changes as well.48 Naturally, there are some
distinctions between the processes for interlanguage translation and
legal translation. "For the interlanguage translator, the source text is
an original text in a foreign language"; for the legal translator, the
source text is the normative text as previously applied in a different
context.4 9 Additionally, for the interlanguage translator, the second
text is a new text in a different language; for the legal translator, the
reconstructed text is a new application of the original text where the
background context has changed .5  As a result, the interlanguage
translator must preserve the meaning of the original text in the new
text, but the legal translator must ensure that the meaning of the new
application is the same as the meaning of the original application.5'
43. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1184.
44. Id. at 1188.
45. Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at 1370; Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at
1189.
46. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1189; Lessig, Understanding Changed Read-
ings, supra note 17, at 406; Lessig, What Drives Derivability, supra note 17, at 843.
Webster's defines "translate" as "to turn into one's own or another language." Mer-
riam-Webster Dictionary 764 (5th ed. 1994).
47. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1189; Lessig, Understanding Changed Read-
ings, supra note 17, at 406-07; Lessig, What Drives Derivability, supra note 17, at 843.
48. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1189-90.
49. Id. at 1213.
50. Id; see Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 17, at 406.
51. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1213.
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To practice legal translation, the translator must engage in two sepa-
rate processes. First, the translator must develop an understanding of
the material to be translated-the process of finding "familiarity."52
Second, the translator must find sameness in meaning-the process of
finding "equivalence."53 To find familiarity, the translator must have
knowledge "of the source text and context, the target text and context,
and the relationship between the two."'54 Further, the translator
should understand how that text compares with others near it and,
additionally, understand the text's "purpose, the assumptions that un-
derlie it, the scope of its reach, and [the] theories it embraces."' '55 Fa-
miliarity is required so that the translator understands "from where
and to where meaning is to be carried. '56
Once the translator has knowledge of both texts and contexts, she
must find equivalence in meaning between the two contexts. To find
equivalence, the translator must create a text that the original author
would have created had the original author been in the present con-
text.57 As the first step in finding equivalence, the translator must set
norms of equivalence because determining what constitutes an
equivalent meaning depends on the purpose of the translation itself,
or on what the translator is attempting to preserve between the two
texts.58 For example, in placing a parable from the Bible in modern
English and in a modern context, the objective is to impart a lesson.
This may require making significant changes in the text to allow the
receiver to relate personally to the parable.59 If instead the text were
a novel to be translated into a foreign language, the translator might
be more concerned with conveying the actual language of the original
text. Equivalence in meaning would therefore differ for these two
types of texts.
A second step to find equivalence is the translator's "duty of crea-
tivity" when confronted with interpretive gaps that cannot be filled by
simply replicating the words of the original text.60 Professor Lessig,
52. Id. at 1194.
53. Id.
54. Id,
55. Id at 1196.
56. Id at 1195.
57. Id at 1196.
58. Id.; Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at 1374-76 (providing instructions to chil-
drens' toys and political plays as examples of the range of texts that would require
different types of translation).
59. For an example of how a translator would make such changes, see Lessig, Fi-
delity, supra note 16, at 1198-1200.
60. Id, at 1205-06. For an example of how the translator's duty of creativity oper-
ates, see Lessig, Constraint, supra note 17, at 1375. Lessig argues that this "construc-
tive element" is inherent in every interpretive undertaking. Lessig, The Limits of
Lieber, supra note 17, at 2252. Professor Levinson questions whether Lessig's transla-
tion model is a helpful analogy because "the only person truly capable of offering an
authoritative assessment of any given translation would in fact not require any such
translation herself." Levinson, supra note 11, at 1468. Likewise, he asserts that a per-
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providing a simple example of such an interpretive gap, noted that the
Constitution nowhere mentions an air force although it expressly gives
Congress authority to create and support both an army and a navy.61
Of course, an air force could not have existed in 1789, so it would defy
logic to find, on the basis of this exclusion, that the Air Force is uncon-
stitutional. Accordingly, the translator must exercise some discretion
in deciding how such gaps are to be filled. The translator may even
have to disregard the actual language of the original text in order to
preserve the original meaning.' There must necessarily be limits to
this creativity, however, because fidelity theory rests on the premise
that judges must remain faithful to the texts drafted by Congress or
the Framers.63
B. Translation as a More Faithful Method of Constitutional
Interpretation
Previously, commentators analyzing the Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence in the context of voting rights have generally
used an originalist approach in their analyses.' Professor Lessig's
model of translation, however, provides a more faithful method of
constitutional interpretation. As Professor Flaherty argues, "the most
appropriate way to maintain fidelity to the Founding is not through
literal 'originalism,' such as that advanced by Justice Scalia and Judge
Bork, but through models that serve the Founders' more general pur-
poses in light of changed circumstances, as suggested by Lawrence
son requiring a translator would not be able to assess the accuracy of the translation.
Id. Professor Levinson's criticism, however, fails to recognize the usefulness of Pro-
fessor Lessig's translation model to accommodate these inevitable interpretive gaps.
61. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1203.
62. Id at 1206; see also Schauer, supra note 26, at 1296 & n.7 (discussing the view
that factors other than a constitutional text, such as background culture and policy
preferences, are controlling and claiming that this view is implicit in Lessig's transla-
tion model).
63. See Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1182. Professor Lessig contends that
translators must therefore be constrained in their duty of creativity by an ethic of
"humility" in order to remain faithful to the original text. Id. at 1206-07. Where
changed presuppositions mandate that translators accommodate that change, transla-
tors should make the smallest possible change to accomplish that goal and should
never "improve" the text for that would not be true to the text of the original author,
and hence would no longer be translation. ld. at 1207. Further, Professor Lessig
posits that humility provides two different types of limitations: "structural humility"
and "humility of capacity." Id. at 1252. Structural humility counsels that there is a
domain of protected "political" presuppositions that judges are required to ignore.
Id. at 1254. Professor Lessig explains that political presuppositions are those that
require a value judgement; judges may not account for changed presuppositions re-
garding what is best or most desirable-that is for the political branches to decide. See
id. at 158-59. Humility of capacity recognizes that there are certain kinds of presup-
positions which judges may not account for because the material is too complex or
because the judges do not have the resources necessary to properly address them. Id.
at 1261
64. See supra note 11.
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Lessig. '' 65 As noted above, translation recognizes that changes in
background context may require changed readings of a text to pre-
serve the text's original meaning in light of the changed context.66
Under the strict originalist approach, a changed reading is automati-
cally an act of interpretive infidelity simply because it strays from the
meaning the Framers and Ratifiers would have given it.67 Therefore,
originalists often limit their inquiry to ask only how the Framers and
Ratifiers would have answered the question.68 The translator, in con-
trast, recognizing that interpretive change may be required to remain
faithful to the original meaning of the Constitution, attempts to re-
serve the meaning of the original text across changing contexts. 69
Translation remedies the failure of the originalist approach to keep
the Constitution in tune with changing times.70 The Framers did not
and, more importantly, could not discuss certain issues of present in-
terest, such as whether the Fourth Amendment applies to electronic
eavesdropping. 71 This ambiguity makes it difficult to implement
originalism.72 Translation provides a solution by recognizing that the
translator may have to alter the original application in such a case to
preserve the original meaning in the present context. As a method of
constitutional interpretation, originalism "attempts to implement the
rule of law by assuming that the meanings of words and rules are sta-
ble over extended periods. '73 Even Justice Scalia, who is a self-pro-
65. Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1811. John Hart Ely similarly notes that "[aln inter-
pretivist approach-at least one that approaches constitutional provisions as self-con-
tained units-proves on analysis incapable of keeping faith with the evident spirit of
certain of the provisions." John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73 (1980). Note
that Ely's "clause-bound interpretivism" is simply another term for the approach des-
ignated here as "originalism." See Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Distrust Revis-
ited, 77 Va. L. Rev. 641, 641 (1991).
66. See supra part I.A.
67. See Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1169. Professor Rubenfeld similarly
notes that "strict originalism... must twist and turn in agonies of rationalization if it
wants to account for the great departures from original intent-the single example of
Brown v. Board of Education is sufficient [as an example] here." Rubenfeld, supra
note 11, at 1486 (footnote omitted).
68. Professor Rubenfeld argues, however, that "no account of political legitimacy
could ever yield the conclusion that this aged text... exerts any legitimate authority
over American citizens today," Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 1110, because the idea
that a sovereign people create a written constitution to bind future generations "vio-
lates the very principle of self-government on which the Constitution claims legiti-
macy in the first place." Id at 1111. For this reason, originalism is inconsistent with
the concept of self-government. Id. at 1113-14.
69. See Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 16, at 1171-73; Treanor, supra note 23, at 857-
58.
70. Farber, supra note 11, at 1095-97; Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1811-12; Treanor,
supra note 23, at 858.
71. See Farber, supra note 11, at 1093; Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 788
(1983).
72. Farber, supra note 11, at 1093.
73. Tushnet, supra note 71, at 785.
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claimed originalist, admits that he may be only a "faint-hearted
originalist" because in practice it can be problematic to base decisions
strictly upon views held in 1791. 74 He provides as an example that
public flogging in 1791 would not have been considered "cruel and
unusual" under an Eighth Amendment challenge. As a result, under
the originalist approach such a punishment should not presently be
deemed unconstitutional; yet Justice Scalia acknowledges that he
could not imagine upholding such a statute now.75
Moreover, translation, as a practice of constitutional interpretation,
appears to be consistent with the expectation of the Framers.
Originalism has been criticized as self-contradictory because the
Framers may not have intended that judges would use an originalist
approach.76 The framers did not endorse strict literalism as the proper
method of constitutional interpretation; rather, they recognized that
unforeseen issues would arise in the future requiring some further
construction of the Constitution.' As Professor Treanor points out,
"[t]his notion of an adaptable Constitution is represented perhaps
most famously by Chief Justice Marshall's statement in McCulloch v.
Maryland: 'We must never forget it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding.' '78 Although Professor Lessig's fidelity theory begins at
the same point as originalism, the second step of translation accounts
for changes since the framing of the original text and is therefore a
more faithful method of constitutional interpretation.
Professor Lessig's fidelity model allows the Constitution to be inter-
preted to apply to present concerns, and thereby provides a method
to determine if a changed reading of the Constitution is nonetheless
faithful in the present context. Translation is therefore a more useful
method than originalism to analyze the Supreme Court's reading of
the Equal Protection Clause in the Shaw I line of cases.
74. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L Rev. 849, 864
(1989).
75. Id. at 861-62, 864.
76. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985). Powell also points to Alexander Hamilton's views on con-
stitutional interpretation as expressed in The Federalist and a formal opinion Hamil-
ton submitted to President Washington. See id at 915. Hamilton claimed that
"whatever may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution, or of a law,
that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to the usual &
established rules of construction." Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitution-
ality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791), reprinted in 8 Papers of Alexander Hamil-
ton 111 (Harold Syrett ed., 1965). So that if "a power ... be deducible by fair
inference from the whole or any part of the numerous provisions of the constitution
of the United States, arguments drawn from extrinsic circumstances, regarding the
intention of the convention, must be rejected." Id
77. See Powell, supra note 76, at 904; Treanor, supra note 23, at 857 (arguing that
"[t]he framers were not traditional originalists. They created a terse, open-ended con-
stitution whose meaning would change in response to changed circumstances").
78. See Treanor, supra note 23, at 857 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
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II. TRACING THE VOTING RIGHTS CASES
In the recent voting rights cases beginning with Shaw I and followed
by Miller v. Johnson,79 Shaw v. Hunt ° ("Shaw II"), and Bush v.
Vera,81 the Supreme Court found that a number of voting district
plans violated the Equal Protection Clause where race was the pre-
dominant consideration in creating the district lines. 2 These cases de-
part, however, from earlier Supreme Court decisions where the Court
found race to be a permissible basis for drawing district lines and re-
quired a showing of discriminatory effects in order to establish an
equal protection claim.83 This departure is made apparent by tracking
the voting rights cases which precede Shaw L This part examines
these pre-Shaw I cases and then traces the development of Shaw I and
its progeny.
A. Pre-Shaw I Cases
In Baker v. Carr,84 the Court first recognized that an allegation of
vote dilution85 brought in response to a state legislative apportion-
ment plan constituted an equal protection claim subject to adjudica-
tion by federal courts.86 The Baker Court failed, however, to provide
the constitutional standard to analyze such a claim beyond advising
that the standard would be found under the Equal Protection
Clause.' In Reynolds v. Sims,88 the Court was again presented with a
79. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
80. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
81. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
82. In another case, United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995), plaintiffs
brought a similar equal protection claim but the Court held that the plaintiffs, who did
not live in the district at issue, lacked standing to bring the suit.
83. See infra part II.A.
84. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
85. A vote dilution claim asserts that the petitioner's right to vote has been im-
paired because the value or weight of the vote has been minimized. As declared by
Justice Douglas in South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), "[tjhere is more to the right to
vote than ... the right to pull a lever in a voting booth. The right to vote includes the
right to have the ballot counted. It also includes the right to have the vote counted at
full value without dilution or discount." Id. at 279 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Vote dilution claims have been termed the "second generation" of voting
rights claims whereas practices which denied access to the ballot box constituted the
"first generation" rights. See Lani Guinier, No Th'o Seats: The Elusive Quest for Polit-
ical Equality, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1413, 1424 (1991); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting
and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 1833 (1992).
86. The petitioners in Baker alleged that the State's apportionment of the seats in
the Tennessee legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause. Baker, 369 U.S. at
187-88. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial census and reapportion-
ment but the Tennessee legislature failed to reapportion between 1901 and 1961. Id. at
189-91.
87. Id at 226.
88. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Note also that in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), a
case decided in-between Baker and Reynolds, the Court found Georgia's system for
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vote dilution claim in response to a state legislature's apportionment
plan. The plaintiffs in Reynolds were voters of Jefferson County, Ala-
bama who claimed that their rights under both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Alabama Constitution were violated based on the ap-
portionment plan of the Alabama Legislature.89 The Alabama State
Constitution required reapportionment of the Legislature every ten
years in response to a decennial census.9° There had been no reappor-
tionment in Alabama, however, from 1901 until the plaintiffs brought
suit in 1961.91 As a result of this failure, the plaintiffs maintained that
certain counties, such as Jefferson, suffered from discrimination in the
legislative representation allotted to them because the population
growth in Alabama in that time had been irregular.' In that sixty-
year period, Alabama's population rose from 1,828,697 to 3,244,286.93
The increase occurred entirely in the urban areas while a number of
the rural counties actually decreased in population. 4 Furthermore,
the district court determined on the basis of the 1960 census results
that "only 25.1% of the State's total population resided in districts
represented by a majority of the members of the Senate, and only
25.7% lived in counties which could elect a majority of the members
of the House of Representatives."9
The district court, after finding that the districting plan violated the
Equal Protection Clause, fashioned a temporary reapportionment
plan which it ordered into effect for the 1962 election.96 The Supreme
Court upheld the district court's ruling and temporary plan,97 main-
taining that "[d]iluting the weight of votes because of place of resi-
dence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon fac-
tors such as race."98 The Court noted further that "the fundamental
statewide primary elections unconstitutional because it allowed the votes of some
Georgia voters to be diluted based on where they resided within the state. Unlike
Baker, Gray did "not involve a question of the degree to which the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the authority of a State Legislature in
designing the geographic districts from which representatives are chosen." Gray, 372
U.S. at 376. The Gray Court reasoned, however, that the Equal Protection Clause
mandates that all who participate in an election have an equal vote without distinction
based on race or place of residence. Id. at 379-80.
89. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 537.
90. IL at 539.
91. Id. at 542, 569-70.
92. 1L at 540.
93. Id. at 542 n.7.
94. Id. at 543 n.7.
95. Id. at 545.
96. Id. at 545, 552. The district court gave the legislature an opportunity to design
a new apportionment plan after finding a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but the court later rejected the two plans proposed by the legislature as discrimina-
tory. Id. at 546-47. The district court's provisional plan incorporated part of each plan
but only on a temporary basis. Id. at 552.
97. Id. at 586-87.
98. Id. at 566.
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principle of representative government in this country is one of equal
representation for equal numbers of people."99 The Reynolds Court
therefore established that the "constitutional standard [under] the
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses.., be
apportioned on a population basis."'10
Similarly, in Wright v. Rockefeller'0' African-American and Puerto
Rican voters challenged a statute which established the congressional
districts in New York County, claiming it created racially segregated
districts in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.10 2
The Wright Court rejected the claim, however, holding that the plain-
tiffs "failed to prove that the New York Legislature was either moti-
vated by racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial
lines."'01 3 Although the Court recognized that there was evidence
demonstrating that the New York Legislature may have drawn the dis-
trict lines on the basis of race, it decided that other plausible infer-
ences could be drawn from this same evidence so that the plaintiffs'
claim could not be sustained. °4 A year after Wright and Reynolds
were decided, the Voting Rights Act of 1965105 ("VRA" or "Act")
was enacted. Most of the remaining voting rights cases were decided
in accordance with the Act.
The VRA was enacted to force the Southern States to comply with
the Fifteenth Amendment's command that "[t]he right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."'01 6 Nevertheless, the Fifteenth Amendment
had not been effectively enforced after Reconstruction. For example,
in 1964, even though civil rights acts addressing the exclusion of Afri-
can-Americans from the right to vote had been promulgated in 1957,
1960, and 1964, an average of only 22.5% of the African-Americans
eligible to vote were registered to do so in Alabama, Georgia, Louisi-
ana and Mississippi because of strong white resistance. 0 7 Indeed, in
Mississippi only 6.7% of the African-Americans eligible were regis-
tered to vote.'08 In response, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered
his attorney general, Nicholas Katzenbach, to draft a voting bill which
99. Id at 560-61.
100. Id. at 568. Otherwise, state districting plans that allot "the same number of
representatives to unequal numbers of constituents" will undervalue the vote of those
in the more populated district. Id. at 563. Reynolds thus established the "one person,
one vote" standard. See id. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)).
101. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
102. See id. at 54.
103. Id. at 56.
104. Id. at 56-58.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
106. U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
107. Davidson, supra note 3, at 13.
108. Id.
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the President then presented to Congress on March 15, 1965. 09 When
Congress passed the VRA that August, it enacted a law which went
much further than the acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 in providing for
federal enforcement of African-Americans' rights to register and to
vote.110
The Court first addressed the VRA in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach.111 In Katzenbach, South Carolina challenged several provisions
of the VRA as violative of the Constitution and sought an injunction
against the Attorney General's enforcement of these provisions.' 2
The Court found that Congress passed the VRA "to banish the blight
of racial discrimination in voting," to create new remedies, and to
strengthen those remedies already existing to further this end.' 3
Most importantly, in view of later cases," 4 section 2 of the VRA pro-
hibits the use of voting qualifications which deny or abridge the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color"15 and section 5 suspends all new voting regulations in covered
states until federal authorities determine the regulations will not have
a discriminatory effect." 6 The Court further determined that Con-
109. Id at 16-17. Two events in particular precipitated the drafting of the voting
bill. First, the murder of three civil rights workers who were part of a grass-roots
effort to counter the white resistance to African-American voting in Mississippi in the
summer of 1964. Id. at 14. Second, the severe beating of 90-100 peaceful marchers in
Selma, Alabama on March 7, 1965, later termed "Bloody Sunday." 1Id at 16. In
Selma, at the time of the march, out of approximately 15,000 eligible African-Ameri-
can voters, only 335 were registered because of the onerous registration process. Id. at
15.
110. Id at 17. The VRA's enactment was split along regional rather than party
lines with the northerners supporting it and the southerners opposing it. Id.
111. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
112. Id at 307. South Carolina alleged that the VRA "exceed[ed] the powers of
Congress and encroach[ed] on an area reserved to the States by the Constitution." Id.
at 323.
113. Id at 308. The Court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and concluded
that Congress deemed this legislation necessary to address the still-pervasive problem
of racial discrimination in voting which past remedies had failed to eradicate. Id. at
309-15. The remedial provisions of the Act automatically cover any state that on No-
vember 1, 1964, "maintained a 'test or device"' as a prerequisite to voting or where
"less than 50% of its voting-age residents were registered on November 1, 1964." Id.
at 317.
114. See infra note 118.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). Congress amended section 2 in 1982 in response to
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which declared that minority voters had to
prove discriminatory intent behind a voting practice in order for it to violate section 2
or the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35
(1986). In amending section 2, Congress clarified that a violation could be established
by showing discriminatory effect alone. Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). Section 5 establishes that if a State covered by the
Act passes any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1964" the State must, in order to enforce the enactment, receive a declaratory judg-
ment in the District Court for the District of Columbia that it "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
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gress had the authority to create these remedies under section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 117 The Court therefore upheld the contested
provisions of the VRA and denied South Carolina's request for an
injunction." 8
Although two subsequent cases, Whitecomb v. Chavis"9 and White
v. Regester,120 were decided without reference to the VRA, their hold-
ings were later used to determine whether either the Equal Protection
Clause or section 2 of the VRA had been violated.'' In Whitecomb,
the plaintiffs challenged two Indiana statutes which provided for
multi-member districting.' The plaintiffs claimed that such district-
ing diluted the vote of African-American voters within Marion
County in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 3 The Court rec-
ognized that multi-member districts may minimize the value of a ra-
cial or political group's vote within the voting population, but placed
on the challenger the burden of proving that multi-member districting
diluted the quality of representation in comparison to single-member
districting. l 4 In this case, the challengers could not meet their burden
account of race or color." Id. The State also has the option of submitting the pro-
posed enactment to the U.S. Attorney General for preclearance. Id. If the Attorney
General does not respond in 60 days, the State may enforce the enactment. Id.
117. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). Section 1 of the Fif-
teenth Amendment provides that "[tjhe right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1. Section
2 then states that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation." U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2.
118. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308. Almost all of the claims brought under the VRA
since Katzenbach have been brought under either section 2 or section 5. Later cases
clarify the scope of these provisions. For instance, in Allen v. State Board of Elec-
tions, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), at issue was whether new laws passed in Mississippi and
Virginia fell under section 5's pre-clearance requirement. Id. at 550-53. The Court
held that the statutes in question, which sought to change a board of supervisors elec-
tion to an at-large election, require the superintendent of education to be appointed
instead of elected, change the requirements for independent candidates running in the
general election, and change a bulletin to allow election judges to aid illiterate voters,
were covered by section 5. Id, at 572. The Court also concluded that challenges re-
garding section 5 coverage must be heard by a district court of three judges. Id. at 563.
119. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
120. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
121. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (discussing use of Whitecomb
and White holdings in subsequent voting rights cases).
122. Whitecomb, 403 U.S. at 128-29. Multi-member districts "allow for serial voting
that, in the context of a majority voting bloc, will reward a cohesive majority with
superordinate representation." Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 1840. Multi-member and
at-large electoral schemes permit each voter "to vote separately on each candidate for
office, thereby allowing a voting majority to control every seat in an election."
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 590.
123. Whitecomb, 403 U.S. at 128-29. Plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality
of multi-member districting in general. Id. at 144. The Court, however, declined to
adopt a per se rule against multi-member districting. Id. at 147.
124. Id at 142-44.
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because they had "equal opportunity to participate in and influence
the selection of candidates and legislators."'"
Following Whitecomb, the Court in White" held that a racial group
could establish a claim that multi-member districting was being used
to dilute its vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by
presenting evidence to show that the Whitecomb standard was vio-
lated: that "the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that
its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the dis-
trict to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice."127 The Court later used this "results test" from White to
identify violations of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act' s The Court
additionally provided a number of factors to be used in determining
whether the "totality of the circumstances" indicated a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause under this test.2 9 Several factors to be
considered were the number of representatives to be elected from
the minority group, the cultural and economic realities of the minor-
ity group, and the past and present discrimination against that
group. 130
Returning to cases decided under the VRA, the Supreme Court, in
Georgia v. United States,'31 held that for purposes of section 5, a
state's newly enacted reapportionment plan was a change in "voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or proce-
dure with respect to voting" and therefore subject to preclearance.132
The Court also clarified that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment
plan under section 5 does not have to prove that the change has a
racially discriminatory purpose; instead the issue is whether the
change would conceivably dilute the value of the African-American
125. Id at 153.
126. In White, a redistricting plan for the Texas House of Representatives was chal-
lenged on two grounds: first, that the plan created "impermissible deviations from
population equality"; second, that it created multi-member districts which diluted the
voting power of racial and ethnic minorities. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 759
(1973). The Court rejected the first claim, itL at 764, but held that the multi-member
districting at issue did dilute the weight of the racial minorities in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 765, 769-70.
127. Id. at 766 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971)).
128. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).
129. White, 412 U.S. at 766-69.
130. Id.
131. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
132. Id. at 529 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c). Georgia. which was subject to section
5, failed to obtain preclearance for its 1972 reapportionment plan from either the
Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 527-28.
The reapportionment plan increased the number of multi-member districts and re-
quired any candidate who received less than a majority of votes to partake in a major-
ity runoff election. Id. at 528-29.
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vote.133 In Beer v. United States,134 the Court further construed sec-
tion 5 of the Act, maintaining that a legislative apportionment plan
that improves the position of a racial minority cannot violate section
5, unless this new plan itself is so discriminatory as to violate the Con-
stitution.135 Section 5, rather, prevents only a retrogression in the po-
sition of a racial minority,136
United Jewish Orgs. of Williansburgh, Inc. v. Carey,137 ("UJO")
most clearly demonstrates that the Court's later reading of the Equal
Protection Clause in the Shaw I line of cases marks a departure from
its reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the earlier voting rights
cases. In UJO, the New York legislature promulgated a new district-
ing plan which created more non-white majorities in two districts to
comply with section 5 of the Act and to secure approval from the At-
torney General who had objected to New York's prior districting
plan. 38 Petitioners were members of a Hasidic community who
claimed that the new districting plan, which separated their commu-
nity into two separate districts, diluted their vote by "halving its effec-
tiveness" and violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the
district was drawn to achieve a racial quota.139 Petitioners also
claimed that the district lines were created exclusively on the basis of
race which diluted their voting power in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 40
The Court rejected the petitioners' arguments for a number of rea-
sons. The Court found that "compliance with the Act in reapportion-
ment cases would often necessitate the use of racial considerations in
drawing district lines' 141 and that a reapportionment plan will not vio-
late the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment simply because the legis-
lature used numerical quotas in creating majority-black districts.142
The Court also noted that, independently of the VRA, New York's
plan did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments because
it did not represent a "racial slur or stigma with respect to whites,"
and it did not "fenc[e] out.., the white population from participation
133. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. at 534. The Court confirmed in City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), that under section 5 the electoral change
only has to be shown to have a discriminatory effect, it need not have a discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 172, 177.
134. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
135. Id. at 141.
136. Id.
137. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
138. Id. at 150-52.
139. Id. at 152-53.
140. Id. at 153.
141. Id. at 159. The Court noted that "the Constitution does not prevent a State
subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black major-
ities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies
with § 5." Id. at 161.
142. Id. at 162.
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in the political processes of the county" or "minimize or unfairly can-
cel out white voting strength.' 43 Under the reasoning of UJO, one of
these above harms would have been required for the petitioners to
have established a constitutional 
claim.'"
In two later cases, Davis v. Bandemer45 and Thornburg v. Gin-
gles,146 the Court confirmed that the proper test to establish vote dilu-
tion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause was the "results test"
from White.'47 In Davis, the plaintiffs were Democrats contesting an
Indiana redistricting plan as political gerrymandering.' 18 The Court
found that for claims of both racial and political gerrymandering "the
question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally de-
nied its chance to effectively influence the political process."1 49 In
Thornburg, the Court held that section 2 of the VRA was violated
"where the 'totality of the circumstances' reveal that 'the political
processes leading to nomination or election.., are not equally open
to participation by members of a [protected class]."'15 Thornburg ad-
ditionally requires minority voters to meet three requirements under
section 2 to establish a vote dilution claim in a multi-member district:
first, that the minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district"; second,
that the minority group is "politically cohesive"; and third, that the
white majority votes as a bloc "usually to defeat the minority's pre-
ferred candidate."'' The pre-Shaw I cases therefore required the
plaintiffs to demonstrate the discriminatory effect of a districting plan
in order to establish an equal protection claim.
B. Shaw I and Its Progeny
Beginning with Shaw I, the Court's approach to equal protection in
the voting rights cases unjustifiably departed from the approach taken
in UJO and the earlier line of cases. The plaintiffs in Shaw I contested
North Carolina's 1991 districting plan which had created two new ma-
jority-black districts in order to comply with section 5 of the Act. 52
The plaintiffs contended that this new districting plan effected an un-
constitutional racial gerrymander because the districts were created
143. Id. at 165.
144. The Court concluded that white majorities were left in 70% of the districts
while the population was 65% white. Therefore, even if racial block voting occurred
whites would not be proportionally underrepresented. Id. at 166.
145. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
146. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
147. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 35; Davis, 478 U.S. at 131.
148. Davis, 478 U.S. at 115.
149. Id. at 132-33.
150. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 43; see supra note 116 (noting that Congress amended
section 2 to establish that the White "results test" was the correct legal standard).
151. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
152. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634-35 (1993).
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solely on the basis of race without considering traditional districting
criteria.15 3 Although recognizing that race-conscious districting is
sometimes permissible, the Shaw I Court found that the plaintiffs had
stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause for "redistricting
legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally
can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of
voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without
sufficiently compelling justification.' '1 54
The Court attempted to distinguish Shaw I from the earlier vote
dilution cases, claiming that "[c]lassifying citizens by race, as we have
said, threatens special harms that are not present in our vote-dilution
cases. It therefore warrants different analysis.'1 5  Because all racial
classifications were subject to strict scrutiny, the Court further held
that on remand, unless the plaintiffs were to fail in their racial gerry-
mander claim, the District Court must determine whether the district-
ing plan survived strict scrutiny. 5 6 In the voting rights cases decided
prior to Shaw I, however, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny to
districting plans which had considered race in drawing district lines
such as UJO.
57
The Court built on its Shaw I decision in Miller v. Johnson.'58 In
Miller, plaintiffs were five white Georgia voters who alleged that
Georgia's 1992 districting plan, which created three new majority-mi-
nority districts,5 9 constituted a racial gerrymander in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause under Shaw .160 The Court explained that
153. Id at 633-34, 637.
154. Id. at 642. The Court explained that "appearances do matter" in reapportion-
ment because of the danger of racial stereotyping which may be present when a dis-
tricting plan "includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but
who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and
who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin." Id. at
647.
155. Id at 649-50. The dissenters noted, however, that "[a] plan that 'segregates'
being functionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymander-
ing, we should be consistent in what we require from a claimant: proof of discrimina-
tory purpose and effect." Id at 671 (White, J., dissenting).
156. Id at 653. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislation in question must be "narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 658.
157. See text accompanying notes 139-42.
158. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
159. A majority-minority district is a voting district drawn so that a racial minority
constitutes the majority of the voting population in that in that district. See id. at 2483-
84.
160. Id at 2485. Georgia redistricted after the 1990 Decennial Census. Id. at 2483.
Because the district in question was covered by the Act, the legislature sought
preclearance from the Attorney General for the redistricting plan. Id. The Georgia
legislature submitted two plans, each containing two majority-minority districts, but
the Justice Department rejected the plans. Id at 2484. The legislature then submitted
the third plan, at issue in Miller, which created three majority-minority districts. It is
the third majority-minority district created, the Eleventh District, which the plaintiffs
in Miller contested. Id at 2484-85.
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bizarre shape was not a threshold requirement to sustain an equal pro-
tection claim under Shaw .161 Rather, the Miller Court found that
"the essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw is that
the State has used race as a basis for separating voters into dis-
tricts."'16 The Court reasoned that to establish this claim a plaintiff
could show "either through circumstantial evidence of a district's
shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative
purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legisla-
ture's decision to place a significant number of voters within or with-
out a particular district."'1 63 After determining that Georgia's
redistricting plan was motivated predominantly by racial considera-
tions, the Court subjected the plan to a strict scrutiny analysis and
found that it failed for lack of a compelling state interest.'6 The
Court declined to decide whether compliance with the VRA alone
could suffice as a compelling state interest. Rather, the Court held
that the redistricting plan in Miller was not required to comply with
section 5 of the VRA because that section prohibits only a retrogres-
sion in the position of racial minorities unless the new plan itself is
discriminatory. 65 The Court reasoned that the Justice Department's
rejection of two ameliorative plans previously submitted by Georgia
which would have satisfied section 5 demonstrated that the Justice
Department was "driven by its policy of maximizin majority-black
districts" which was beyond the scope of section 5.'
The two most recent cases in this line, Shaw I/167 and Bush v.
Vera,'68 were similar decisions handed down by the Court on the same
day. In Shaw II, the Court was presented with the district court's find-
ing on remand in Shaw L The district court had found that the North
Carolina redistricting plan at issue in Shaw I had been drawn on the
basis of race, but held that it nonetheless survived strict scrutiny be-
cause it was narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state interest
161. 1& at 2486. Note that after Shaw I the appellants' argument in Miller-that
bizarre shape was a threshold requirement-seemed to be the correct reading of
Shaw I; indeed, even the dissenting justices in Shaw I believed that "[blecause the
holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances ... it perhaps will not substan-
tially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities."
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 659 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
162. 115 S. Ct. at 2485-86.
163. Id. at 2488.
164. IL at 2490-91. The Court accepted the district court's determination that race
was the predominant factor in the creation of the Eleventh District. The district court
found that the shape of the Eleventh District combined with the racial demographics
indicated that the districting had deliberately incorporated segments of the black pop-
ulation into the district. Id at 2488-89.
165. Id at 2490-91.
166. Id at 2492. The Court noted that the two previous plans would have "in-
creased the number of majority-black districts from 1 out of 10 (10%) to 2 out of 11
(18.18%)" so that they "could not have violated § 5's non-retrogression principle." Id.
167. 116 S. CL 1894 (1996).
168. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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of compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the VRA. 1 6 9 Finding that sec-
tion 5 did not require the creation of an additional majority-minority
district, the Supreme Court reversed, again declining to decide if com-
pliance with the VRA would suffice as a compelling interest. 170 Fur-
ther, the Court held that the district at issue was not narrowly tailored
to be justified as a way to avoid liability under section 2.171 On ap-
peal, the State also argued that its "interest in remedying the effects of
past or present racial discrimination" should suffice as a compelling
state interest.172 The Court, however, maintained that two conditions
would have to be present for this interest to be compelling: (1) the
discrimination would have to be "identified"'17 3 rather than "[a] gener-
alized assertion of past discrimination"; 174 and (2) the State would
need a "'strong basis in evidence' to conclude that remedial action
was necessary, 'before it embarks on an affirmative-action
program."175
In Bush, the plaintiffs contested a redistricting plan in Texas which
created three new majority-minority voting districts under the
VRA.' 76 The plaintiffs alleged that the districting plan constituted ra-
cial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 77
The Court held that under Shaw I and Miller, the Texas redistricting
plan was subject to strict scrutiny. 178 The Court found that a redis-
tricting plan would not be subject to strict scrutiny simply because it
was promulgated with "consciousness of race"'179 but would apply
where race was the "predominant factor" in drawing the district
lines.180 The Court acknowledged that Bush was a "mixed motive
case" because evidence showed that the legislature was motivated by
concerns other than creating majority-minority districts, such as in-
cumbency protection, when they drew the district lines.' 8 ' The Court
169. Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1899-900.
170. The Court concluded that its decision in Miller foreclosed the section 5 argu-
ment, id. at 1903-04, and noted that the district court's opinion preceded the Supreme
Court's Miller decision. Idt at 1900.
171. Id at 1905. The additional district created, District 12, did not contain a "geo-
graphically compact" minority group which is required under Thornburg to establish
a section 2 challenge. I& at 1905-06.
172. lId at 1902.
173. Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 499 (1989)).
174. lId at 1902-03.
175. Id. at 1903 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
The Court accepted the district court's finding on this point that the State's "interest
in ameliorating past discrimination did not actually precipitate the use of race in the
redistricting plan." Id. at 1903.
176. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1950-51 (1996).
177. Id. at 1951. The district court held that the three new majority-minority dis-
tricts were unconstitutional and the Governor of Texas appealed. Id.
178. Id
179. Id at 1951 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993)).
180. Id at 1952 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995)).
181. Id at 1952.
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nonetheless held that strict scrutiny applied based on the findings of
the District Court"s and found that, as in Shaw II, the redistricting
plan was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state inter-
est.'83 This approach in Bush, however, is inconsistent with the ap-
proach taken earlier in Wright v. Rockefeller."s In Wright, despite
evidence that the New York Legislature was motivated by racial con-
siderations when it drew the district lines in question, the Court would
not find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because there were
alternative inferences which could be drawn from that evidence.'la
As demonstrated above, the Court beginning with Shaw I no longer
requires plaintiffs to prove the discriminatory effects of a redistricting
plan in order to establish an equal protection violation. Instead,
under Shaw I and its progeny, it is sufficient to prove only that race
was the "predominant factor" in the creation of district lines. This
constitutes a changed reading of the Equal Protection Clause. 18 To
determine if this new reading is faithful to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, part III will apply translation theory to Shaw I and its progeny.
I. APPLICATION OF FMELITY THEORY TO SHAW I AND ITS
PROGENY
In determining whether the Supreme Court's reading of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Shaw I and its progeny constitutes a faithful
reading, the first step of Professor Lessig's fidelity analysis is to read
the Equal Protection Clause in its original context to discover the
meaning it had at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.187 This part first reviews the legislative history of the Four-
182. The district court found that the Texas legislature intended to create majority-
minority districts to comply with section 5 of the VRA, that the three districts did not
follow traditional districting criteria such as compactness, and that they had used a
computer program containing detailed racial statistics in drawing the district lines. Id.
at 1952-53. The Court recognized that none of these factors alone would necessarily
require the application of strict scrutiny. Id. at 1953.
183. The appellants here advanced the same state interests that were advanced in
Shaw II: avoiding liability under section 2 of the VRA, complying with section 5's
"nonretrogression" principle, and remedying the effects of past discrimination. Id. at
1960. These arguments were rejected for the same reasons expressed in Shaw I. See
supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
184. Wright v, Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
185. Id. at 56-57.
186. See infra part I.B.
187. It should be noted that the Supreme Court avoids discussing the original
meaning of the Reconstruction amendments in the voting rights cases beginning with
Shaw L See Rosen, supra note 10, at 791. This is logical considering that the Court's
approach is at odds with an originalist understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. It is particularly interesting in light of Justice Scalia's own comment, as a self-
proclaimed originalist, that "nonoriginalist opinions have almost always had the de-
cency to lie... about what they were doing-either ignoring strong evidence of origi-
nal intent ... or else not discussing original intent at all, speaking in terms of broad
constitutional generalities with no pretense of historical support." Scalia, supra note
74, at 852.
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teenth Amendment to demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause
was not intended to bar racial classifications as unconstitutional. 18
Second, this part asserts that Madison's view of representative govern-
ment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly,
the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment sanction
race-conscious legislation to ensure that racial minorities are provided
with equal access to the political process.8 9 This understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause would, in addition, preclude the application
of strict scrutiny to race-conscious legislation enacted by the majority
to benefit the minority.190 Finally, this part engages in the second step
of Professor Lessig's theory, translation, to determine whether a pre-
supposition has changed so that the Court's new reading of the Equal
Protection Clause would nonetheless remain faithful to the original
meaning.
A. Step I: The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Congress, at the outset of the Civil War, had not formulated a policy
regarding the rights of the emancipated slaves, nor had it devised a
plan to enforce these rights.191 The freedmen had to be integrated
into society, however, and to become self-sufficient; the Republican
Congress tried to improve the position of the freedmen in the occu-
pied South through legislation enacted from 1862 through 1865.192 In
1865, Congress enacted a bill creating the Freedmen's Bureau to over-
see matters concerning the emancipated slaves for the duration of the
war. 93 Also in 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified pro-
scribing slavery and involuntary servitude. 94 Actions of the former
Confederate states after the Civil War revealed that more was needed
to guarantee the civil rights of the newly freed slaves, leading the Con-
gressional Republicans to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 95
188. See infra part III.A.1.
189. See infra part III.A.2.
190. IL
191. Herman Belz, Emancipation and Equal Rights: Politics and Constitutionalism
in the Civil War Era 66-67 (1978).
192. Id at 49, 67.
193. Ia at 69-70 (providing relief assistance and renting land to the freedmen); Al-
exander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 n.20 (1955).
194. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
195. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 879 (1986).
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1. The Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment
To discern the original understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause it is necessary to examine the legislative history of the Four-
teenth Amendment and, additionally, the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866196 ("CRA") which the 39th Congress enacted
in the same session in which it promulgated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."9 The Congressional Republicans incorporated the CRA into
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment because they feared
that a future Congress would repeal the statute and eliminate the safe-
guards it provided.198 The CRA was enacted under Congress's power
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment in response to the "Black
Codes" of the Southern states which deprived the freedmen of funda-
mental civil rights.199 The CRA's constitutionality, however, had been
questioned from the outset, even by its draftsmen.2c Therefore, the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to constitutionalize the CRA2°0
and its Framers often spoke as if the two were identical. °  Section I
of the CRA conferred citizenship on African-Americans and at-
tempted to guarantee certain fundamental rights for all United States
citizens.2"3 It is clear from the congressional debates that the CRA
protected only those civil rights enumerated in the Act; it did not ex-
tend protection for political rights2° and did not proscribe all racial
discrimination.2 °"
196. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
197. See Bickel, supra note 193, at 7; Kaczorowski, supra note 195, at 864-66;
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L Rev.
947, 957, 960 (1995). Alexander M. Bickel also suggests that it is useful to consider
the failed Freedman's Bureau Bill which would have increased the authority of the
Freedmen's Bureau but was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson. Bickel, supra note
193, at 7. The 39th Congress passed the Bill which required the Southern States to
extend to African-Americans all the "civil rights and immunities which are enjoyed by
the white people" and upon their failure to do so would have required the President
to extend military protection to carry out this imperative. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 318 (1866).
198. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer).
199. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474, 1123-25 (1866).
200. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291-92 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
201. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866).
202. McConnell, supra note 197, at 957, 960; see also Kaczorowski, supra note 195,
at 911-12 (arguing that it is important to recognize the identity in meaning of the
CRA and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment because both were intended by the
framers to affirmatively guarantee civil rights even though the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was worded negatively).
203. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The CRA secured the
rights "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property... as is enjoyed by
white citizens." Id.
204. Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-76 (statements of Rep. Trumbull).
205. See Bickel, supra note 193, at 12-13; see also Kaczorowski, supra note 195, at
881-82; McConnell, supra note 197, at 958.
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The Fourteenth Amendment similarly did not explicitly prohibit ra-
cial discrimination in all circumstances. Rather, it secured "the natu-
ral rights of free men-the rights to life, liberty, and property-as the
basic civil rights of United States citizens. '20 6 The Fourteenth
Amendment did not prohibit discrimination in the context of political
or social rights.207 For example, the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment deliberately excluded the right to vote from those rights
secured by the Amendment. 08 In addition, there is nothing in the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to suggest an inten-
tion to prohibit school segregation: "[T]he Reconstruction Congress
considered, debated, and ultimately rejected measures to prohibit
school segregation under its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment."20 9
206. Kaczorowski, supra note 195, at 884; see Michael Klarman, An Interpretive
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 216, 220 (1991); see also
Rosen, supra note 10, at 792 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
"to all citizens a limited set of absolute civil rights" rather than proscribing all racial
discrimination).
Several articles have criticized the Supreme Court's "colorblind" approach. See
Thomas C. Berg, Religion, Race, Segregation, and Districting: Comparing Kiryas Joel
with Shaw/Miller, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 365, 366 (1995-96); Conference, Race Law and
Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 567, 573
(1996); Natapoff, Madisonian Multiculturalism, supra note 10, at 752; Rosen, supra
note 10, at 791. The Court has not yet required color-blindness, however, although a
number of Justices seem to be moving in that direction for government classifications.
See Rodney A. Smolla, The Ghosts of Homer Plessy, 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1037, 1052-
53 (1996). The "color-blind" language was originally used by Justice Harlan in his
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), where he stated that "[o]ur Consti-
tution is color-blind." IL at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It has been argued, however,
that Justice Harlan was not arguing for color-blindness as the term is now understood.
Rather, Justice Harlan's dissent may be interpreted as "an attack, not on the use of
racial classifications, but on a social system based on an ideology of white
supremacy." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 961, 961; see also
Rosen, supra note 10, at 793 (arguing that "Harlan's complicated dissent is subject to
many readings, but a per se rule against intentional discrimination in all circumstances
is not one of them.... To the extent that Justice Harlan is arguing for a color-blind
constitution, it is in respect to civil rights alone."). But see Raskin, supra note 10, at
744 (agreeing that our society was not founded on color-blindness but arguing that
Justice Harlan viewed color-blindness "as a principle of formal neutrality that would
allow white people to continue their absolute dominance of American life").
207. See McConnell, supra note 197, at 1024; Rosen, supra note 10, at 793; Jeffrey
Rosen, Conservatives v. Originalism, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 465, 465 (1996).
208. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511, 2539, 2542-43, 2766-67 (1866).
209. McConnell, supra note 197, at 956; Tushnet, supra note 71, at 800; see also
Klarman, supra note 206, at 252-53 (discussing failure of Senator Charles Sumner to
have legislation enacted to prohibit school segregation in 1870s as evidence that such
segregation was not viewed as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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2. The Equal Protection Clause as the Embodiment of Madison's
Theory of Representation
The Framers of the Constitution intended to establish a representa-
tive government in order to control the problem of factions.2 10
Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens ... who are united
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, ad-
verse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community. '2 1' Madison recognized further that fac-
tionalism is particularly dangerous where the majority is included in
the faction, because it would be able to sacrifice the rights of the mi-
nority to its own self-interest.2 2 Madison recognized the impossibility
of remedying the causes of factions, which he believed to be inherent
in human nature,21 3 but argued instead for controlling their effect:
"[T]he majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be
rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and
carry into effect schemes of oppression. '2 14 Madison believed the sys-
tem of representation set up by the Constitution would prevent such
majority tyranny. 15 He proposed that the variety of interests and par-
210. The Federalist No. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Willey Book Co. ed., 1901); see
Ely, supra note 65, at 80; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 39-45 (1985); Sue Chrisman, Commentary, Evans v. Romer: An
"Old" Right Comes Out, 72 Deny. U. L. Rev. 519, 533 (1995); Norman R. Williams H,
Note, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial Review, 69 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 963, 963 (1994); see also Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Pro-
tection Doctrine, 91 Yale LJ. 1403, 1422 n.73 (1982) ("Madisonian process-based the-
ory... comports with the constitutional text, the intent of the Framers, and the
structure and relation of various constitutional clauses.... [Slecond, it represents the
political theory of the man who largely designed the Constitution. Thus a Madisonian
process-based theory must necessarily be an [originalist] theory .... "). This is further
evidenced by the fact that "Madison's Federalist Papers were widely read by those
who ratified the Constitution." Id. For the argument that one should look to the
intention of the Ratifiers, not the Framers, see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Un-
derstanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const. Commentary 77, 77-78 (1988).
211. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 210, at 45. Under this definition, Madison's
view of "faction" would certainly apply to racial classifications, considering the his-
tory and current social reality of racial minorities in the United States. See Natapoff,
supra note 10, at 752. Dean Jamin B. Raskin has similarly argued that multicultural-
ism is consistent with the American political ethic, noting that "[a]lthough Madison
was concerned about protecting the economic elite and propertied class from the tyr-
anny of the mob.. . his views could be transposed to the nation's struggle over race."
Raskin, supra note 10, at 749.
212. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 210, at 47; see Ely, supra note 65, at 153
(arguing that "[r]ace prejudice, in short, provides the 'majority of the whole' with that
'common motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that Madison believed improb-
able in a pluralistic society" (quoting Frank L Goodman, De Facto School Segregation:
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 315 (1972))).
213. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 210, at 45-46.
214. Id at 48.
215. See id at 49-51.
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ties included in the republic would render it unlikely that the majority
would unite to deprive other citizens of their rights.216
According to John Hart Ely, the Framers of the Constitution ex-
pected those elected to represent the interests of all the people and
attempted to protect the interest of minorities in two ways.217 First,
the Framers structured the Constitution to allow a variety of voices to
be heard so that no majority coalition could control the political pro-
cess permanently. 218 Second, the Bill of Rights provided the people
with a number of individual protections. 21 9 These two methods, how-
ever, were soon recognized as insufficient for protecting the minority
from the destructive will of the majority.22 To preserve Madison's
concept of a republican form of government, then, the existing theory
of representation had to be expanded to guarantee that a representa-
tive would not sacrifice the interests of the minority of her constitu-
ents to the interests of the majority. 2 Ely asserts that "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is obviously our
Constitution's most dramatic embodiment of this ideal. Before that
amendment was ratified, however, its theory was understood, and
functioned as a component.., of the concept of representation that
had been at the core of our Constitution from the beginning."'222 Pro-
fessor Sunstein similarly posits that the Equal Protection Clause "is
best understood as an attempt to impose on government a particular
conception of politics, with powerful Madisonian overtones."
216. Id. at 50.
217. Ely, supra note 65, at 79.
218. ld. at 80.
219. Id. at 79.
220. Id. at 81 (explaining that under the model of pluralism, a majority, construed
as a number of cooperating minorities, may fail to protect a minority which the major-
ity views as different where the majority has the ability to, and interest in, advantaging
itself at the expense of that minority). For example, prior to the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Southern states continued to disregard black emancipation and did so under Southern
statutes. See Kaczorowski, supra note 195, at 874-75.
221. Ely, supra note 65, at 82.
222. Id. Judge Posner, in evaluating Ely's Democracy and Distrust, explained that
Ely's theory rests on the premise that the Constitution's "basic purpose-also that of
the amendments from the Bill of Rights to the present-is to create a system of gov-
ernment in which elected representatives will do a sincere and competent job of rep-
resenting the interests of all the people." Posner, supra note 65, at 643. Although
Judge Posner claimed he remained unconvinced that Ely's theory accurately applied
to every constitutional provision, he recognized that "the equal protection clause ...
fit[s] his model without strain." Id. at 644.
223. Sunstein, supra note 210, at 30. Sunstein suggests that "Madisonian Republi-
canism" is really an "intermediate position" between the traditional republicanism
espoused by the Anti-federalists and interest-group pluralism. Id. at 47-48. For exam-
ple, Madison rejected the traditional republican model which argued that direct par-
ticipation in small republics would prevent faction and tyranny of the majority.
Madison also rejected the conception of politics as a process consisting only of trade-
offs between competing factions. Id. at 46-47. Sunstein further asserts that the Equal
Protection Clause may be viewed as a rejection of the pluralist view of politics be-
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This political process reading of the Equal Protection Clause and,
additionally, the suggestion that judicial intervention is appropriate to
ensure access to the political process, was perhaps most famously ex-
pressed by Justice Stone in footnote four of the Court's opinion in
United States v. Carolene Products Co.' 4 Justice Stone noted that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those polit-
ical processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry."'' As explained by Professor Klarman "[e]qual protection,
from a political process perspective, principally concerns judicial solic-
itude for groups unable to fend for themselves in the political trenches
because of disenfranchisement, blatant prejudice, negative stereotyp-
ing, or some combination thereof."'' 26
As noted above, the Supreme Court's evaluation of equal protec-
tion claims in the voting rights cases preceding Shaw I was consistent
with the political process theory of equal protection. In Reynolds v.
Sims,' 7 the Court found that "the Equal Protection Clause guaran-
tees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the elec-
tion of state legislators" and found that the Equal Protection Clause
would be violated where the weight of a vote was diluted because of
race or place of business'-m In both White v. Regester- 9 and
Whitecomb v. Chavis,-0 the Court held that plaintiffs had to establish
that the political processes leading to nomination and election were
not equally open to participation by the group in question to establish
cause it recognizes the evil of distributing "resources or opportunities to one group
rather than another solely because those benefited have exercised the raw power to
obtain governmental assistance." ld. at 50-51.
224. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Ely maintains that footnote four "suggests that it is an
appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic government
running as it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and commu-
nication are kept open." Ely, supra note 65, at 76. Ely additionally notes that foot-
note four contemplates the Court's role in monitoring how majorities treat minorities.
Md; see Klarman, supra note 206, at 310 (asserting that political process theory was
first clearly stated by Justice Stone in footnote four and later expanded by Ely into a
"full-blown constitutional theory").
Ely also proposes that the Warren Court's interventionist approach was guided by
the "participational" goals of providing equal access to the political process for all
viewpoints and remedying discrimination against minorities. Ely, supra note 65, at 74.
225. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
226. Klarman, supra note 206, at 310.
227. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
228. Id. at 566; see also Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 1519, 1523 (1997) (noting that Reynolds v. Sims "can be rationalized in
Carolene terms"); Klarman, supra note 206, at 258-263 & n.236 (arguing that political
process theory motivated the Court to enter the apportionment cases beginning with
Baker and guided a number of their later decisions including Reynolds and UJO).
229. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
230. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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an equal protection violation.23' Likewise, in United Jewish Organiza-
tions of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,"2 ("UJO") the Court found that
the plaintiffs failed to establish an equal protection claim because the
white population was not fenced out from the political process or their
vote unfairly diluted. 33 Similarly in Davis v. Bandemer,34 the Court
held that an equal protection violation would be established only
where "a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its
chance to effectively influence the political process.' ' 35 In Shaw I,
however, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a districting plan which
was beneficial to racial minorities. 36 This application of strict scrutiny
to an affirmative action program is contrary to the political process
theory because in these programs it is the white majority disadvantag-
ing itself to advantage the minority. Whites "can amply defend them-
selves in the political arena, and thus should not qualify for special
judicial protection."'-37
B. Step II of Fidelity: Translating the Equal Protection Clause in
the Context of Voting Rights
This part first shows that the Shaw I Court created a new constitu-
tional claim for racial gerrymandering, or segregating voters in dis-
tricts on the basis of race, that does not require a showing of
discriminatory effects. In so doing, the Court departed from the es-
tablished understanding of equal protection in voting rights cases: it
introduced a changed reading of the Equal Protection Clause. This
part applies the second step of Professor Lessig's fidelity theory to
demonstrate that this changed reading of the Constitution is unfaithful
to the Constitution because it is not supported by a changed presup-
position with regard to the Equal Protection Clause. This part notes
that Shaw I did not provide any justification, or suggest a changed
presupposition, to support this new equal protection claim. It merely
asserted that a claim of segregating voters on the basis of race is dis-
tinct from the prior vote dilution cases, and therefore requires a differ-
231. White, 412 U.S. at 765-66; Whitecomb, 403 U.S. at 153; see also Issacharoff,
supra note 85, at 1842-43 (contending that White "struck down multimember election
practices because of an effective abridgement of ... the right of racial and ethnic
minorities meaningfully to participate in the political process").
232. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
233. Id. at 164-65.
234. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
235. Id- at 132-33.
236. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
237. Klarman, supra note 206, at 311 (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 735 (1974)); see also Natapoff,
supra note 10, at 755 (arguing that Madison's view of the danger of the majority fac-
tion supports the notion that whites may sometimes be treated differently than racial
minorities under the Equal Protection Clause because whites are, and have been his-
torically, the majority with control over the political process).
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ent analysis. 3 As this part reveals however, the cases are not
distinguishable. This part then argues that without evidence of a
changed presupposition, this new reading is not faithful to the Equal
Protection Clause because, as noted by the dissenting Justices in the
Shaw I line of cases, there is no injury to white plaintiffs who have not
been shut out of the political process. This part concludes that the
Court should return to requiring a showing of discriminatory effects in
order to establish an equal protection violation because there has
been no changed presupposition to justify the changed reading in
Shaw L
1. The Court's Changed Reading of the Equal Protection Clause
in Shaw I
Shaw I and its progeny demonstrate that the Court has strayed from
earlier cases where the Court found it permissible to use racial criteria
as a basis for drawing district lines. This departure is clearly evi-
denced when these cases are compared to the Court's earlier UJO
decision where it held that "the Constitution does not prevent a State
subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserv-
ing black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its
reapportionment plan complies with [section] 5.'139 This statement
forcefully reveals the Court's later departure because the North Caro-
lina districting plan at issue in Shaw I was, like the plan in UJO, cre-
ated to comply with section 5.40 But the Shaw I Court found that
districting on the basis of race was impermissible as it "bears an un-
comfortable resemblance to political apartheid."24' In addition, as
discussed above, earlier voting rights cases required the plaintiffs to
show that they were denied equal access to influence the political
processes, in order to establish an equal protection claim based on
vote dilution. 2 In Shaw I and Miller v. Johnson,24 3 by contrast, the
238. Note that Professor Lessig's translation theory has been used in the past
mainly to justify changed readings as faithful where there has been a change in con-
text. See, e.g., Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 17, at 453 (assert-
ing that the New Deal was a justified response to changes in economic and social
context and "changes in law's understanding of itself"). As Professor Levinson noted,
"[Lessig's] primary purpose has in fact been to defend-some might even say offer
apologetics for-many of the important changes that have occurred in our constitu-
tional fabric." Levinson, supra note 11, at 1461. Professor Lessig, however, has recog-
nized that there is a negative use of his translation theory. Lessig, Constraint, supra
note 17, at 1368. This Note uses Professor Lessig's theory in its negative sense to
demonstrate that where there is no changed presupposition, a changed reading must
be unfaithful.
239. United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977).
240. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 634-35.
241. Id. at 647.
242. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986); Thomburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986); UJO, 430 U.S. at 164-65; White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-
66 (1973); Whitecomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
243. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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Court found equal protection violations with a showing of racial ger-
rymandering or voter segregation on the basis of race.2 4  Further-
more, Miller and Bush v. Vera245 expanded Shaw I such that a
violation could now be established merely by demonstrating that race
was the predominant factor in the creation of district lines.5 6
The changed reading in Shaw I is additionally demonstrated by the
Court's failure to cite to precedent which supports its reasoning. In
Shaw I, the majority cites Gomillion v. Lightfoot24 7 and Wright as pre-
cedent for its decision.248 Neither of these earlier decisions, however,
supports Shaw L In Gomillion, the Alabama legislature passed a stat-
ute which altered the shape of Thskegee from a square to a twenty-
eight-sided figure, thereby removing almost all of its African-Ameri-
can voters without removing a single white voter.249 Petitioners main-
tained that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and denied them the right to
vote in municipal elections in violation of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.250 In Gomillion, therefore, the white majority had changed the
city lines in order to exclude a racial minority from municipal elec-
tions and services. In contrast, the Shaw I plaintiffs did not, and could
not, assert a similar purpose or effect in the North Carolina districting
plan;251 in Shaw I, the minority group was benefited rather than
harmed. In Wright, the plaintiffs claimed that New York congres-
sional districts were segregated by race in violation of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. 252 The Wright Court found, however,
that the plaintiffs failed to show discriminatory intent or that the lines
had actually been drawn on racial grounds.253 As noted by Justice
White in his Shaw I dissent, it is difficult "to see how a decision based
on a failure to establish discriminatory intent. can support the infer-
ence that it is unnecessary to prove discriminatory effect."254
Thus, the Court's recognition of racial gerrymander as a new equal
protection claim marks a changed reading of the Equal Protection
Clause because prior to Shaw I the Court found it permissible to draw
district lines on the basis of race. The Shaw I Court also departed
from its earlier voting rights cases by no longer requiring a showing of
discriminatory effect to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment." Fi-
244. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 649, 657-658; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482, 2485.
245. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
246. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488; Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1953.
247. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
248. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 644-46.
249. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340-41.
250. Id The Court was only deciding whether the petitioners could bring this claim
under the Constitution, rather than the truth of petitioners' allegations. Id. at 341.
251. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 669 (White, J., dissenting).
252. Wright, 376 U.S. at 56.
253. Id
254. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 669 (White, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 649.
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nally, that the Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment has
changed is further evidenced by its failure to cite to precedent which
supports its Shaw I decision.
2. The Shaw I Court's Failure to Assert a Changed Presupposition
to Justify Its Changed Reading of the Equal Protection
Clause
Having established that a changed reading has occurred, under Pro-
fessor Lessig's fidelity theory, the new reading must follow a change in
context for it to remain faithful to the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Under an originalist approach, the Court's
changed reading would be unfaithful simply because it departed from
the original understanding; Professor Lessig's theory, however, recog-
nizes that changed readings are sometimes necessary to preserve the
original meaning of the text3l 6 The Shaw I Court, nonetheless, failed
to justify its changed reading of the Equal Protection Clause as follow-
ing a changed presupposition. Rather, the Court attempted to distin-
guish the claim of racial gerrymander as distinct from the vote dilution
claims presented in the earlier voting rights cases. The majority found
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the district lines in
question were drawn so unconventionally that they could only have
been drawn on the basis of race and with complete disregard for tradi-
tional districting criteria.257 The Court contended that a claim that
district lines were drawn to segregate voters on the basis of race
"threatens special harms that are not present in our vote-dilution
cases. It therefore warrants different analysis."' 58 The Court held
that strict scrutiny would be applied where district lines were created
on the basis of race.259 The Court distinguished UJO, finding that
"UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reappor-
tionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immedi-
ately offends principles of racial equality." 26
Justice White's dissent in Shaw I reveals, however, that Shaw I is
not distinct from the earlier voting rights cases and therefore required
a changed presupposition to be a faithful reading of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Justice White maintained that the Shaw I appellants
failed to allege a cognizable injury because prior to Shaw I there were
only two types of state voting practices which were found to violate
the Constitution: (1) a denial of the right to vote; or (2) vote dilution
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause which requires a showing
that the challenged districting has both the intent and effect of re-
stricting a political or racial group's influence on the political pro-
256. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
257. Shaw , 509 U.S. at 642.
258. ML at 649-50.
259. ML at 644.
260. Id. at 652.
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cess.2 61 Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in UJO, argued
further that the facts of Shaw I "mirror those presented in [UJO]" and
noted that five of the Justices in UJO found that the plaintiffs could
not claim an equal protection violation because "members of the
white majority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the
political process had been unfairly canceled."26 Thus, "it is irrefuta-
ble that appellants in this proceeding likewise have failed to state a
claim. 2
63
The dissenters in Shaw I also criticized the majority for creating a
new constitutional claim-"race-conscious redistricting that 'segre-
gates' by drawing odd-shaped lines"-as somehow distinct from a
claim of vote dilution-"race-conscious redistricting that affects
groups in some other way."' 26" The dissenters pointed out that the
plaintiffs in UJO had made claims similar to those of the plaintiffs in
Shaw L The UJO plaintiffs claimed that the New York districting plan
violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because the dis-
trict lines were drawn only on the basis of race.265 This demonstrates
that the "analytically distinct claim" recognized by the Shaw I major-
ity was available to the UJO Court but was rejected because the plain-
tiffs could not show discriminatory effect.266 Therefore, "[t]he fact
that a demonstration of discriminatory effect was required in [UJO]
was not a function of the kind of claim that was made. It was a func-
tion of the type of injury upon which the Court insisted.2 67
The Court in Miller, Shaw 11, and Bush simply expanded Shaw I
without providing any further justification for the Court's departure
from the earlier voting rights cases. The Miller Court again took pains
to distinguish UJO as a vote dilution case: as "explained in Shaw...
[UJO's] analysis does not apply to a claim that the State has separated
voters on the basis of race. 2 68 The dissenters noted that under Shaw
I the Miller plaintiffs failed to state an equal protection claim because
in Shaw I the violation was the disregard of traditional districting cri-
teria so that race was ultimately the only consideration.269 The Geor-
gia districting plan at issue in Miller followed traditional districting
factors.271 The Miller Court, however, expanded Shaw I to find an
equal protection violation simply where race was the predominant
261. Id at 659-60 (White, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 658 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also notes that the Court in
Whitecomb, White, and Davis similarly required plaintiffs to show they were excluded
from effectively influencing the political process in order to establish an equal protec-
tion claim. Id at 661-63.
263. Id at 665.
264. Id at 667.
265. UJO, 430 U.S. at 155.
266. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 668 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority).
267. Id
268. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2487 (1995).
269. Id at 2502 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
270. Id at 2502-04.
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consideration in the creation of a districting plan.271 Following Shaw I
then, the majority subjected the districting plan to strict scrutiny and
found the plan was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest.272 In Shaw 11 and Bush the Court found that, under Shaw I
and Miller, the contested districting plans were subject to strict scru-
tiny and in both cases found the districts were not narrowly tailored to
further a compelling state interest.273 The Shaw I Court did not assert
that a presupposition had changed in the time between UJO and Shaw
I to justify its changed reading as faithful. It simply asserted that a
claim of racial gerrymander was distinct from a claim of vote dilution
and therefore required a different analysis. As seen above, however, a
claim of racial gerrymander is not distinct from the earlier vote dilu-
tion claims. Accordingly, the Court's changed reading of the Equal
Protection Clause is unfaithful and invalid because there is no evi-
dence of a changed presupposition.
3. The Court Should Return to Requiring a Showing of
Discriminatory Effect to Establish an Equal Protection
Claim
As discussed above, classifications based on race to ensure racial
minorities equal access to the political process comport with the origi-
nal understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.274 In keeping with
this understanding, the pre-Shaw I voting rights cases required a
showing of discriminatory effect to establish an equal protection claim
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.275 The reading of the
Equal Protection Clause in the Shaw I line of cases, allowing members
of the white majority to bring equal protection claims without a show-
ing that the contested districting plan has any discriminatory effect,
therefore departs from the earlier cases and is not faithful to the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Miller dissenters noted that racial minorities
have historically been denied fair representation in the political pro-
cess which should entitle them to equal protection rights.276 These
rights should not be extended, however, to a majority that has not
been denied access to the political process. 2 " Justice Stevens asserted
further in his Miller dissent that respondents had alleged no legally
cognizable injury without a claim of vote dilution and, additionally,
that a district plan drawn to promote fair representation of different
groups cannot constitute an equal protection violation.78 In Bush,
271. Id. at 2488.
272. Id. at 2490.
273. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951-
52 (1996).
274. See supra part III.B.2.
275. Id.
276. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2506 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
277. See id.
278. Id. at 2498-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the dissenters similarly argued that the pre-Shaw I equal protection
violation was the denial of the opportunity to influence the political
process which was not present in Shaw I and its progeny.279
The Supreme Court should return to their policy of requiring a
plaintiff to demonstrate the discriminatory effect of a contested dis-
tricting plan to establish an equal protection violation regarding vot-
ing rights. Shaw I and its progeny allow plaintiffs to establish an equal
protection claim without demonstrating an injury. Returning to the
approach espoused prior to Shaw 1, the Court should instead require a
showing that the plaintiff was denied equal opportunity to influence
the political processes. Such a requirement would be faithful to the
original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION
The Court departed from its earlier reading of the Equal Protection
Clause in voting rights cases beginning with Shaw L After Shaw I and
its progeny, an equal protection claim can be established by showing
that racial considerations were the predominant factor in the creation
of district lines. This is a significant departure from its pre-Shaw I
voting rights cases where, in order to establish a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, a petitioner had to show that a districting plan had
the effect of denying them equal opportunity to influence the political
process. A review of the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment strongly suggests that the Equal Protection Clause was
not intended to prohibit all racial classifications and, further, that it
implemented a certain concept of representative government. Fur-
ther, the Court did not justify its changed reading as responding to a
change in context which, under Professor Lessig's translation theory,
could allow the new reading to nonetheless remain faithful to the orig-
inal meaning of the text. The Court's changed reading of the Equal
Protection Clause is therefore not a faithful reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, the Court should return to requiring a
showing of discriminatory effect to establish an equal protection
violation.
279. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2002-03 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
1854 [Vol. 65
